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NATUl<E OF TIIB CASE 
This appeal is taken fran the decision of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, J. KObert Bullock, Judge, sitting with a 
jury, on the 18th day of May, 1978 at Vernal, Utah. 
A~pellant thereafter obtained permission to file this appeal 
bv wri.t of habeus corpus granted December 29, 19/8 bv Ernest Baldwin 
judg;e of the criminal division in the Third Judicial District Court, 
sittin;o: on the lau and rotion bench. 
DISPOSITION rn FOUR1H DISTRICT COURT 
Appellant was tried before the Court, sitting with a jury, 
on May 18, 1978. Following instructions, presentation of evidence and 
ar",lJilleilt, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of the char(;e ot man-
slaug_hter. The courtaccepted the verdict and sentenced the appellant 
to the indeterminate tenn of 5 years to life in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF somrr ON APPEA'.... 
ADpellant seeks to have the decision of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court reversed and the case remanded tor retrial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was arrested on March 2, 1978 and charged with nrurder 
in the second degree, pursuant to UCA 76-5-203, following the death of 
his 1vife, Tarrrny &:>gg,ess, frcrn a gunshot wolUld. An information was there-
after filed likewise charp;in?; defendant with murder in the second degree. 
-1-
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Detendant v..-.as assigted counsel and entered a plea of not 
f,lliltv to the charge contained in the information. 
Trial on the matter v!as held on May 18, 1 Y73 before the 
Honorable J. Hobert Bullock sittinp; with a b man jury. At the outset, 
tne Coi.rrt issued certain instructions to the jury concernin" the offer,;c 
of second dep;ree murder and rnanslau.Q;..1-iter as defined in the Uta_li Qide. 
(p 5, L. 18 to D 6, L. 18) 
DurLri?, the coi.rrse of the trial Appellant's counsel TIEt with 
coi.msel for the State and with Judge Bullock privately in charlbers and 
made record of intonnation vtlich had cone to him concern111g the impro".€: 
bias of one of the ji.rrors. Cm.msel for Appellant then reserved his ri~:: 
to nove for mistrial. 
At the close of evidence, t~e coi.rrt ar,ain instructed on 
murder in the second degree and manslaughter. The jury was sequesterei 
and a short time later reti.rrned with a verdict of guilty of rnanslau,o)lte: 
No further action was then taken bv counsel for appellant, 
nor Has an appeal filed within 30 davs, as required by la11. 
Appellant was thereafter sentenced to t~e indetenninate tero 
of 5 years to life in the Utah State Prison. 
On Decffi!ber :::9, 1970 appellant's petition for Habeus Ccc 
in Third Judicial District Coi.rrt was heard. 
f F d Co 1 · of La'-' were entered. the Coi.rrt 's Findin~s o _ act an nc us ions -~ 
This a;Jpeal 1·-.as thereupon c0!1I'El1ced. 
-2-
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POl.NT I 
FAILURE TU INSTRUCT THE JURY CONCEBNING 
LESSER INCLLJDE0 OFFEt~~ES lS REVEkSil:\LE 
J<..RROR 
A Defendant m a criminal case is entitled to instructions 
on all lesser included offenses vhlch are supported by any substantial 
evidence. 'lhis Drincinle is fiillll v established in the l.oi:w of Utah. 
A lesser included offense is one whose elemen!:s are all included 
in tl-ie P;reater offense char1;ed. This definition is discussed in State 
v. lwlrna."._, ts4 Utah L3, 33 Pac. 2d. 640 (1934) 
The only wav this matter may be determined is by 
discovering all of the elements required by the 
respective sections, canparin3 them and by a process 
of inclusion and exclusion, determine those camon 
and those not cor.nun, and if the greater offense in-
cludes all the legal and factual elanents, it mav 
safe~ be said that the gfeater includes the lesser, 
if, vever, the lesser o fense requires the inclusion 
of SCJITE necessary element or elements in order to cover 
the completed offense, not so included in the [7eater 
offense, then it may be safely said that the lesser is 
not necessarily included in the greater (anphasis added) 
33P. Ld at 645 
frnl)loying this test to the case at bar, it is clear that the 
greater offense includes all the legal and factual elanents of the lesser. 
TI1e offense of =der in the second decree necessarily includes all the 
els™"nts of the lesser offense of ne~ligent hoori.cide. Nep;ligent hcxnicide 
is an element of the greater offense of rrn.rrder in the second decree and is 
clearly a lesser included offense. 
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A test has been armounced Dy the Court in ?tate v. Lloyd, 
568 P. 2d 357 (1977) and State v. Cornish, 568 P. 2d j6Q ll9!7) In 
t..."lese cases the Court looked to the single criminal episode statute of 
the Utah Code, specifically, Section 76-1-403 (j), (l'J73) in findi.nr 
that joyriding is an offer>Be included rn auto thett. 'lhis section 
provides: 
A defendant rnav be convicted of an offense included 
in the offense- charged but mav not be convicted of 
both the offense Ci1arged and the included otfense. 
An offense is so included ·when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less 
than all t..."le facts reouired to establish the ccmnission 
of the offense charged; or 
(bJ It constitutes-an attempt, solicitation, con-
spiracv, or fonn of preparation to cCK'Illit the offense 
charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically desi~ted bv a statute as a 
lesser included offense. 
Applying the principals of this test to the case at bar, 
it is clear that the offense of negligence hanicide is a lesser in-
cluded offense of murder in ti-ie second decree. The offense of neeliqE': 
hcrnicide falls within paragraph (a) above. It is established by proof 
of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the cOOTD-
ission of the greater offense. 
ln State v. fuu.gherty, 550 P. 2d 17) (1':176) the Utah SUllrll'e 
Court discussed the situations where instructions on lesser included 
offenses are ref!1.1ested and when such instructions must be '.ii~3 
matter of law. Citing Lisby v. ~tate, BL Nev. 183, 414 P · 2d 5gz (!Yif. 
the Utah Court stated: 
-4-
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'lhe court discussed three situations in which the 
problem of less~ lllcluded otfenses are frequently 
encountered. First, where there is evidence which 
would support a finding of guilt of a lesser offense 
or degree; the instruction is mandatory. ' 
Second, where the evidence would not support a find.in~ 
of guilt in the cornnission of· the lesser- offense or ··· 
degree. For example, the defendant aenies any C(J[Tl-
plici ty in the crime charged. and t'lUS lavs no found-
ation for an intermediate '1erdict ;or where the elements 
of the offenses differ, and sane element essential to 
the lesser offense is either not proved or sho:.J!l not to 
exist. This second situation renders and instruction on 
a lesser included offense erroneous, because it is nor 
pertinent. 
TIU.rd, is an intermediate situation. une where the elanents 
of the greater offense include all the elena1ts of the 
lesser offense; because, by its very nature, the greater 
offense could not have been cornnitted ~ .. ri.thout defendant 
having the intent in doing the acts, whic.'i constitute 
the lesser offense. In such a situation instructions on 
the lesser included oftense may be given, because all 
elements of the lesser offense have been nroved. Roi.ever, 
such an instruction may properly be refused if the pro-
secution has met its burden of proof on the >;reater off-
ense, and there is no evidence tendini:; to reduce the greater 
offense. 111.e court concluded by stating that if that be 
anv evidence, however slieht, on any reasonable theory 
of the case under which the defendant might be convicted of 
a lesser included offense, the court IID.ISt, if requested, give 
an appropriate instruction. J50 P.2d at 176. 
Since the instruction on the lesser included offense either 
must have been given or was mandatory, pursuant to the authority quoted 
above, it was error for the trial court not to give it. 
Error in tailinES to give a jury instruction becanes pre-
judicial if there is a '·reasonable likelihood'' that if the reauested 
instruction had been :;iven "it may have had sare effect upon the verdict 
rendered" State v. Mitcheson, 56u P. 2d 1120 (Utal-i 1'377) · Tnis standard 
of reasonable likeli..1-ioocl 11.as been further explained in another context 
-5-
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in State v. Eaten, 569 P. 2d 1114 (Utah, 1977), where the 
Court stated, 
Consistent with the nature of criminal proceedinc< 
and the protections accorded those accused of o· 
crime under our law, including the presumntion of 
innocence and the burden of the state to prove the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt we 
believe that an appeal, when there is a rea~onable 
doubt as to whether the error below was prejudicial 
that doubt should be resolved in favor of the de-
fendant. 569 P.2d. 
This principle is also discussed in State v. Gilli1i 
23 Utah 2d. 372, 463 Pac. 2d. 811 (1970) in which the defendar 
counsel specifically requested an instruction on second degre: 
manslaughter in the trial on an information chare;ing homicide 
The court there held that the defendant is entitled to haver', 
jury instructed on the lesser included offense if there is anv 
substantial evidence to justify it. The court referred to th: 
principle as being generally accepted in Utah law, citinp, to 
State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 Pac. 2d. 738 (1947), ~ 
v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 Pac. 2d. 290 (1943) and~ 
Ferzuson, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55 (1929). 
This is in accord with the law of other western 
jurisdictions which hold that, particularly in cases involvin: 
homicide, the Court must instruct on all lesser included off· 
d The enses which are reasonably supported by the evi ence. I 
. of whether 
holdings in these cases do not turn on the question 
1 the bu:c' 
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upon the court. See State v. Booker, 200 kan, 166, 434 Pac. 
2d 30, (1968); Sanchez v. People,172 Colorado 168, 470 Pac 2d. 
857 (1970); State v. Ramos 108 A 36, 492 Pac 2d 697 (1972); 
State v. Ramirez, 116 A 259, 569 Pac 2d 201 (1977); State v. 
Olsen, 10 R. App 90, 459 Pac 2d. 445 (1968). 
The fact that the jury in this case did return a 
verdict of manslaughter, having chosen t~e alternative lesser 
offense presented to them by the court raises a reasonable 
inference that the jury might have determined the defendant 
guilty of negligent homicide had that offense been presented 
to them for consideration. The Appellant is entitled to have 
this offense presented to the jury; it's exclusion was prejudicial 
and therefore warrants reversal of his conviction in this case. 
The evidence shows that a gun in the hand of the 
defendant did in fact fire, injuring defendant's wife, Tammy 
Boggess and that Tammy Boggess later died as a result of that 
\IOUnd. 
The question before the court and the jury was not 
whether or not these events occured, but the state of mind of 
the defendant at the time of the occurance. 
Defendant was charged with criminal homicide in the 
I second debaree. The elements of that offense are as follows: 
e( 
76-5-203. Murder in the second degree.-(1) 
criminal homicide constitutes murder in the 
second degree if the actor: 
-7-
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(a) Intentionally or knowin81Y caused the death oi 
another or 
(b) Intendin8 to cause serious bodily injury to 
another, he commits an act clearly dangerous to human life 
that causes the death of another; or 
(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing a depravE: 
indifference to human life, he recklessly engaged in conduct 
which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby cac· 
the death of another; or 
(d) While in the cormnission, attempted commission, 0: 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission o' 
aggravated robbery, robber, rape, forcible sodomy, or aggravate 
sexual assault, aggravated arson, agi:;ravated burglary, burglar:· 
aggravated kidnapping, or kidnapping, causes the death of anot': 
person other than a party. 
Manslaughter, on which the jury was also instructed, 
is defined: 
Manslaughter. - (1) Criminal homicide constitutes man· 
slaughter if the actor: 
(a) Recklessly causes the death of another; or 
(b) Causes the death of another under the influence 




Causes the death of another under circu 
. s orovide 
where the actor reasonably believes the circumstance · 
h. conduct 
a moral or legal justification or extenuation for is 
or excusable 
although the conduct is not legally justificable 
-8-
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' .. ,1Jer the existing circumstances. 
Negligent homicide - (1) Criminal 
constitutes negligent homicide if 
acting with criminal negli"ence 




The elements of these offense are substantially the 
same except in the expression of the state of mind of the offender. 
Reference to the definitions of the terms referring to state of 
mind of UCA 76-2-103 shows that criminal negligence differs from 
"recklessness." and both differ from "knowingly" only in degree. 
The Utah Code defines "intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully"; knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or mal-
iciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent" 
76-2-103 A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent to willfully with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result 
of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the re-
sult. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to 
his conduct or to circumstances su~rounding his 
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct 
or the existing circumstances. A person acts know-
ingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result 
of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or th~ result 
of his conduct when he is aware of but continusously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. 
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that 
its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would ex-
ercise under all the circumstances is viewed from 
the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally . 
negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding 
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the circumstances exist or the result 
-9-
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will occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that the failure to perceive it con-
stitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise in all 
th~ circumstances as viewed from the actor's stand-
point. 
The facts presented to the jury in this case substantial. 
support the elements, not only of the offenses of second degree 
homicide and manslaughter, but nelgigent homicide as well. Ev· 
idence of Appellant's intention at the time of the shooting was 
introduced by the victim's statements denying malicious intent 
(P 62 LS to L 14); Appellant's testimony (P 55, L 2 to P 57, L 
30 P 94 L 10 to line 26, P 97 L 24 to L 29 P 101, L 29 toP101~ 
L 14) indicates activities and a State of mind which a reasonab!: 
jury could have characterized as criminal negligence, as defineo 
by Utah law. 
Accordingly, it was error for the Court, with or 
without the request of counsel, to omit an instruction on neg· 
ligent homicide. This omission was prejudicial to appellant 
in that it deprived a jury which was not convinced that appellan: 
killed intentionally and knowingly, that being the element of 
second degree murder which differs from by exceeding the element;! 
of manslaughter. "Criminal negligence" does not significantly 
differ from "recklessly" as used in the definition of the offensi 
of manslaughter. 
h . int Appellant urges reversal and remand on t is po · 
II THE COURT'S FAILURE TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL CONSTITUTES 
REVERSIBLE ERROR 
During the course of the trial, counsel for 
-10- d 
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appellant became apprised of the bias of one of the jurors. 
He notified the Court of his findings during a meeting with 
opposing counsel in the judge's chambers, but did not then or 
later request a mistrial. Defendant asserts that it was in-
cu~bent upon the court to declare a mistrial, based upon the 
information concerning this juror. 
The State of Utah law on this point is established by 
two early cases: 
In State v. Mickle,25 Utah 719, 70 Pac. 2d. 857 (1902) 
a juror previous to trial made a statement to the effect "I think 
the defendants are guilty and they ought to be convicted any-
way on gene;ral principles". This court in that case held that 
the previously expressed bias of a juror which was not admitted 
durin~ voire dire required reversal of the defendant's conviction 
for grand larceny and remand for ,a new trial. 
In State v. Morgan, 23, Ut. 212, 64 Pac. 2d. 356 (1901) 
this court reversed a homicide conviction based upon the pre-
judgment of one juror which was with-held during voire dire 
and further stated that in a homicide case, where the verdict 
must be unanimous, the misconduct of one juror constitutes mis-
conduct of the entire jury, requiring that the defendant be 
given the benefit of an impartial jury and new trial· 
h 
In the case at bar, as in the cases cited above, one 
of the jurors, Mr. Robert Wingar expressed a strong negative 
bias toward the defendant prior to trial and then withheld his 
opinion during the vior dire. This information was made avail-
able to the Court by counsel for defendant· (p 110 L 13 to p 
-11-
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113L23). 
Defendant asserts that it was the affirmative duty 
of the Court to make further inquiry into this matter and to 
declare a mistrial in this case. Failure to do so should be 
deemed a reversible error. 
III APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION, OF COUNSEL 
AS REQUIRED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTIOH OF 
THE UNITED STATES 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitutio:. 
provides that each defendant shall have the right to the ass· 
istancEo of counsel in his defense. The Supreme Court and this 
court have interpreted this phrase to mean the assistance of 
effective counsel. Anderson v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d. 182, 493 
P20. 2d. 1278 (1972). 
In this case the defendant was denied effective re· 
presentation by two grevious errors on the part of his counsel 
The first error is failure to require or otherwise 
i 
discuss and acquaint the jury with the lesser included offense· 
of negligent homicide ... indeed, counsel requested of the ju0 
that they bring in a verdict for the one lesser included off· 
i 
ense of manslaughter, while entirely neglecting the possibilit:' 
of negligent homicide throughout the proceedings. 
Secondly, and perhaps most troublesome, is counsel's 
h h fu lly aware failure to move for mistrial, even throug e was 
h 1. t to the of the defect in the jury, having himself broug t 
attention of the Court. 
-12- b 
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Courts have avoided holding that counsel was ineffective, 
but in case discussing the issue have spoken as follows: In 
State v. Delaney, 351 Pac. 2d. 85, 221 Or. 620 (1960) on appeal 
from conviction for assualt with intent to conunit rape, the court 
stated that a new trial would be granted if the record reflects 
a prejudicial lack of attention and diligence on the part of such 
counsel. Similarly, in State v. Keller, 400 Pac. 2d. 370, 65 
Was, 2d. 907, the court, while affirming the conviction, stated 
the principle that a new trial must be granted when incompetence 
or neglect of appointed counsel results in violation of constitutional 
rights by reducing trial to a farce. 
While defendant does not assert that his trial in this 
case was a farce, counsel's failure to note the lessor included 
offense and especially to act on information concerning im-
propriety in the jury robbed appellant of effective representation 
and the right to a fair and impartial trial. 
The duty of counsel in a criminal matter, and more 
particularly in a conviction for homicide, extends to perfection 
of an ap~eal, should that be the desire of the defendant. In this 
case, even though counsel for appellant was well aware of at 
least one ground for reversal, he failed to perfect an appeal or 
to contact the appellant concerning this matter after his con-
viction. 
Counsel failure to file a timely appeal denies app-
ellant of his opportunity to correct the errors existing at his 
cri.al This denial of due process has been dealt with by the 
Supreme Court in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed. 
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2d. 493, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967), holding that the constitutio 
1 na, 
right to counsel requires that on an indigent defendant's fir; 
appeal from his conviction, court appointed counsel must supp· 
ort the appeal to the best of his ability, and may withdraw 
only after filing briefs on behalf of the appellant and ther, 
only if the court agrees that the appeal is wholly frivolous. 
Counsel's failure to perfect an appeal in this case is submittf 
as further evidence of lack of interest and diligence in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant urges this court to reverse his conviction 
for manslaughter based upon one or more of the errors describe: 
herein. 
Appellant was severaly prejudiced by the trial coun' 
failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of negligen: 
homicide. The elements of negligent homicide were substantial:· 
supported by the evidence adduced. Substantial case law supp· 
orts the proposition that this error requires remand (~ 
Dougherty, supra, State v. Mitcheson, supra, State v. Gil~· 
supra 
Further Appellant was denied a fair trial in this 
case by the impropriety of one juror, which must be imputed to 
all of the jurors (State v. Morgan, supra) and by the failure 
t · cularlv 
of his counsel to remedy or act on these errors. par 1 · 
f 1 juror was much as counsel recoganized the impropriety o t 1e 
ten Iv 
sitting in appellants case; counsel failed to act compe · 
in Appellants behalf as required by ethical cannons 6 !:<-1---
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Appellant submits that each of the errors is suff-
icient to require reversal; that the combination of errors 
renders them more potent, and the effect on the outcome of 
Appellant's case more prejudicial. 
Respectfully Submitted 
David Paul White 
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